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"Want gender equality? Die childless at 30."
- Joan Williams'
*
Professor of Law, Hofstra Research Fellow, and Associate Dean of Intellectual
Life, Maurice A. Deane School of Law, Hofstra University. I am deeply grateful to Professors Melanie Jacobs and Cynthia Starnes and the Michigan State Law Review, especially
Jeffrey B. Same, Senior Symposium Editor, for organizing this symposium; to research librarian Patricia Kasting and research assistant Jennifer Weisser for excellent research assistance; and to Joyce Cox for her skill and patience in preparing the manuscript. I have explored early iterations of some of the ideas developed in this Article in State Responsibility
for Gender Stereotypes, IOWA J. RACE & GENDER (forthcoming 2013) and Anti-Stereotyping
and "The End of Men," 92 B.U. L. REv. ANNEX 1 (2012), available at
http://www.bu.edu/law/central/jd/organizations/joumals/bulr/volume92n4/documents/STAR
K.pdf, and I appreciate the opportunity to consider the issue of gender equality in the concrete, but rapidly changing, context of marriage.
1. Joan C. Williams, Want Gender Equality? Die Childless at Thirty, 27 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 3 (2006).
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INTRODUCTION
Professor Williams was probably right. "Marriage equality" remains
an elusive goal in this country. About ten years ago I wrote an article suggesting that private ordering would be a good alternative to the rather haphazard and arbitrary state law governing marriage.2 Instead, I urged couples
to draft their own "marriage proposals." As an example, I attached a "Gender Equity Marriage Proposal. 3 The idea was that "gender equity" might be
of some interest to some couples, just as others might be more concerned
with a child-centered (or wealth- or environment-centered) model.
I meant well. But my premise was deeply flawed for at least two reasons. First, "gender equity" is not a private preference, like chocolate or
vanilla. Rather, like racial equality, it is a fundamental right, an irreducible
principle, in the private as well as the public sphere. Second, as a corollary,
the notion that private parties might contract their way around gendered
norms despite the ubiquity of such norms in the workplace, the culture, and
the law seems naive if not delusional in hindsight.
This Article takes a different tack. It argues, as many have, that marriage equality-at least as it refers to equality within heterosexual marriages-requires gender equality. It argues further, however, that United States
law cannot assure gender equality because of its pinched, narrow conception
of "rights." Those seeking marriage equality in the United States, accordingly, should look to international human rights law, specifically, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women
((CEDAW) or the (Women's Convention)).'
Part I describes the more recent iterations of the work/family conflict.
This refers to the competing demands of work and family for the increasing
numbers of American women who work outside of the home, while usually
retaining primary responsibility for childcare and housework. Part II describes the ongoing failure of United States law, including the Family and
Medical Leave Act (FMLA),5 the Affordable Care Act,6 and the Constitu-

2. Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern
MarriageLaw, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1479, 1486-87 (2001).
3. Id. at 1546-48.
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1981)
[hereinafter CEDAW]. President Jimmy Carter signed CEDAW in 1980. Id. As a signatory,
under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the United States must
refrain from any action that would "defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty." Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
5. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 7 (1993).
6. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
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tion, to effectively address the work/family conflict and explains why this
failure is likely to continue.
Part III begins by explaining how CEDAW fills the gap in United
States law, making marriage equality possible. It then sets out the costs of
our refusal to ratify CEDAW, including the competitive disadvantage in
global labor markets; the waste of human capital, present and future; and the
perpetuation of unequal marriage, sensibly avoided by growing numbers of
heterosexual women.7
I. NOT YOUR PARENTS' WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT

A. Changing Demographics
Women in the United States, like women everywhere, do most of the
childcare, housework, and general caregiving work.8 Twenty years ago,
Arlie Hochschild and Anne Machung described "the second shift" worked
by employed women in the home, amounting to an extra month's work each
year compared to their husbands.' As sociologist Suzanne Bianchi has more
recently shown, "[m]others still shoulder twice as much child care and
house work," although fathers spend more time taking care of their children
than they used to.' °
In 2010, for the first time in United States history, there were more
women than men in the labor force." The Great Recession hit the manufacturing and construction sectors hard, leaving roughly 20% of working age
men unemployed, the highest rate on record.' 2 Hannah Rosin argues that
these demographics are part of a larger "[economic and] cultural power shift
from men to women."' 3 While critics quickly noted that many of these
women were employed in low-wage service sector jobs, most still have
7. See, e.g., Andrew J. Cherlin, In the Season of Marriage,A Question. Why Bother?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2013, at SR7 (noting a decline in the percentage of women ages
35-44 who have wed from 1988 until 2010).
8. In an influential early article, Nadine Taub dubbed this "nurturing work." Nadine Taub, From ParentalLeaves to Nurturing Leaves, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE
381,381 (1985).
9. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD WITH ANNE MACHUNG, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING
PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3-4 (1989).
10.
SUZANNE M. BIANCHI, JOHN P. ROBINSON & MELISSA A. MILKIE, CHANGING
RHYTHMS OF AMERICAN FAMILY LIFE 177 (2006); see also Melissa A. Milkie et al., The Time
Squeeze: ParentalStatuses and Feelings About Time with Children, 66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
739, 740-41 (2004).
11. Catherine Rampell, Women Now a Majority in American Workplaces, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, at A10; Hanna Rosin, The End of Men, ATLANTIC, July-Aug. 2010, at
56, 60, availableat www.theatlantic.com/magazine/print/2010/07/the-end-of-men/8135/.
12. HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN: AND THE RISE OF WOMEN 86 (2012).
13. Id. at 64.
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caregiving responsibilities. 14 Those in low-wage service jobs are simply less
able to hire other women to take on those responsibilities. While some husbands and partners have stepped up, 5 the lack of quality, affordable childcare, for pre-kindergarten as well as older children, and eldercare leaves
American women increasingly burdened.
B. Why Women Should Still Care
Most other industrialized states assure women are paid maternity
leave, often for extended periods of time. 6 These leaves, along with generous family leave policies, allow both parents to care for babies and young
children at the state's expense." 7 Although such programs are usually gender
neutral, women are much more likely to take advantage of them than men. 8
This results in weaker labor force attachments, in general, for women in
Europe compared with women in the United States.1 9
Julie Suk has argued that this is problematic for American feminists
who support generous family leave."0 To the extent that such policies encourage women to leave the labor force, Suk suggests, they are at best a
mixed blessing.2 Rather, she notes, the absence of such policies contributes
to the shrinking wage gap between American women and men.22

14.

See Joan C. Williams, The End of Men?: Gender Flux in the Face of Precarious

Masculinity,93 B.U. L. REV. 699, 700 (2013).
15. See KATHRYN EDIN & TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD
IN THE INNER CITY (2013).
16. UNITED NATIONS, DEP'TOFECON. & Soc. AFFAIRS, THE WORLD'S WOMEN 2010:
TRENDS
AND
STATISTICS
213-17
(2010),
available
at
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/Worldswomen/WW ful1%20report-color.p
df. The United Kingdom, for example, covers 90% of wages for fifty-two weeks. Id. at 217.
Sweden covers 480 days at 80% of wages. Id. at 216.
17. Id. at 105 & n.48, 216.
18.
Veerle Miranda, Cooking, Caring and Volunteering: Unpaid Work Around the
World 14-15 (OECD Soc., Emp. & Migration Working Papers, No. 116, 2011), available at

http://www.oecd.org/berlin/47258230.pdf.
19. Julie C. Suk, Are Gender Stereotypes Badfor Women? Rethinking Antidiscrimination Law and Work-Family Conflict, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3, 6 (2010).

20.

Id. at 59.

21.

Id.

22. Id. at 66. Based upon median income for full-time, year-round workers, in 2009,
women earned 77% as much as men. CATALYST, WOMEN'S EARNINGS AND INCOME 3 (2011),
available

at

http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran-storage/www.catalyst.org/ContentPages/2447808282.pdf
(citing CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT, BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR & JESSICA C. SMITH, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED

STATES: 2009, at I I fig.2 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p60238.pdf). Women's earnings increased 44% from 1970 to 2007, compared with 6% growth
for men. Id. (citing RICHARD FRY & D'VERA COHN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., WOMEN, MEN, AND
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Over time, however, American women earn far less than men.23 According to the Institute for Women's Policy Research (Women's Institute),
"taking into account women's lower work hours and their years with zero
earnings due to family care... women workers in their prime earning years
earned 62% less than men, or only $0.38 for every dollar men earned."24
Thus, although the lack of paid maternity and family leave results in greater
parity regarding wages for American women and men in some age groups,
this apparent parity vanishes over time. When American women have children,25 their average earnings plummet.26 As the Women's Institute shows:
"The opposite is true for men: Men who are married and have dependent
children are more likely to have higher earnings and work longer hours. 27

H. THE ONGOING FAILURE OF AMERICAN LAW
Despite a rich jurisprudence of reproductive rights, and an even
stronger equal protection jurisprudence, American law affords nominal
safeguards for working parents, especially mothers and pregnant women. As
explained below, this is grounded in our ongoing hostility to basic economic
rights,28 including the right to health.29 President Obama, seeking to generate
popular support for the Affordable Care Act, has recently insisted, "regular
access to a doctor or medicine or preventive care-that's not some earned
privilege; it is a right."3 But many Americans, including the Republican
THE

NEW

ECONOMICS

OF

WOMEN

2

(2010),

available

at

http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2 010/1 l/new-economics-of-marriage.pd).
23. CATALYST, supra note 22, at 5 (citing STEPHEN J.ROSE & HEIDI I. HARTMANN,
INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, STILL A MAN'S LABOR MARKET: THE LONG-TERM

EARNINGS GAP, at iii (2008), availableat http://iwpr.org/pdf/C366 RIB.pdf).
24. Id. (citing ROSE & HARTMANN, supra note 23, at iii).
25.

Most do. See JANE LAWLER DYE, U.S. CENSUS

BUREAU, FERTILITY OF

AMERICAN

WOMEN: 2008, at 3 tbl.1 (2010), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2010pubs/p20563.pdf (showing that 54.3% of women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four raised at
least one child in 2008); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE,
REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 10 (1997) ("Being a mother is considered a
woman's major social role. Society defines all women as mothers or potential mothers.").
26. CATALYST, supra note 22, at 5. This correlates directly with women's assumption of family responsibilities: "During [a] 15-year period, the more likely women are to be
married and have children under 18, the more likely it is that they will be low earners and
have fewer hours in the labor market." Id. (citing ROSE & HARTMANN, supra note 23, at 27).
27. Id. (citing ROSE & HARTMANN, supra note 23, at 27).
28. See Barbara Stark, At Last? Ratification of the Economic Covenant As a Congressional-ExecutiveAgreement, 20 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107 (2011) (arguing that the United States should ratify the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights).
29. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12, Dec.
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
30. Robert Pear & Peter Baker, Health Law Is Defended with Vigor by President,
N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 2013, at Al 1.
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governors who have rejected billions of dollars in federal Medicaid funds,
still reject this view.31
A. State Law
California and New Jersey are the only two states with public paid
leave family insurance programs.32 The California Paid Family Care Leave
Act assures
up to six weeks of wage replacement benefits to workers who take time off work to
care for a seriously ill child, spouse, parent, domestic partner, or to bond with a
minor child within one year33of the birth or placement of the child in connection
with foster care or adoption.

The New Jersey law entitles an employee to six weeks of paid leave to
care for a newborn child.3 California, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico additionally provide temporary disability
insurance (TDI) for "disabilities" caused by pregnancy-related complications, childbirth, and recovery from childbirth.35
B. Federal Law
1. The Affordable Care Act
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (Affordable Care
Act), which President Obama signed in March 2010, represents a major step
forward.36 The Affordable Care Act requires almost all Americans (94%) to

Pat Garofalo, GOP Governors Play Politics with Life and Death, U.S. NEWS &
2013),
http://www.usnews.comL/opinionlblogs/pat(June
4,
garofalo/2013/06/04/study-rejecting-obamacare-medicaid-expansion-costs-gop-governorsmoney (noting that fourteen Republican governors turned down the Medicaid expansion
contained in the Affordable Healthcare Act, and in turn rejected $8.4 billion in federal funding through 2016).
32. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAILING ITs FAMILIES: LACK OF PAID LEAVE AND WORKFAMILY SUPPORTS IN THE US 23 (2011), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/
reports/us021 Iwebwcover.pdf.
33. See CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 3301(a)(1) (West 2013).
34. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:21-39, .1, .3 (2013).
35. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32, at 22-23.
36. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. I I 1-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010). See generally DENNIS P. ANDRULIS ET AL., JOINT CTR. FOR POLITICAL & ECON.
STUDIES, PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2010: ADVANCING HEALTH
EQUITY FOR RACIALLY AND ETHNICALLY DIVERSE POPULATIONS (2010), available at
http://www.jointcenter.org/sites/default/fies/upload/research/files/Patient%2Protection% 2 0
and%20Affordable%2OCare%2OAct.pdf.
31.

WORLD

REP.
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obtain health insurance and provides subsidies enabling them to do so.37 The
price for Republican support, however, was the explicit exclusion of coverage for abortion.38
In addition, the powerful insurance lobby was able to eliminate the
single-payor option, which has enabled the other industrialized states to
provide universal health coverage at a reasonable cost.39 Finally, the United
States still does not recognize health care as a human right.' The failure to
explicitly acknowledge that it is in fact a right, rather than a mere policy
preference, leaves the right to health vulnerable to the attacks and erosion
already underway.4'
2. The FMLA
The FMLA assures certain employees maternity leave, without pay,
for up to twelve weeks. 2 While it represents an important breakthrough, its
limitations have been well documented. 3 First, over 40% of employees are
not covered, and fewer than half--47%-in the private sector are both covered and eligible to take leave.' Even for those who are covered, however,
the FMLA does not directly address the deeply entrenched gendered stereotypes of caregiving women and breadwinning men. Rather, it is only after
such stereotypes have been imposed that the law affords a remedy. 5 Thus,
when William Hibbs found that twelve weeks of intermittent leave under
the FMLA was not enough to care for his wife, Dianne, who had been seri-

37.

The

RESPONSIBLE

Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
REFORM

FOR

Detailed Summary,

MIDDLE

CLASS,

http://www.dpc.senate.gov/healthreformbill/healthbill04.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2013).
38. 155 CONG. REC. 12,921 (2009). The Stupak-Pitts Amendment bars abortion
coverage in "public option" portions of plans as well as barring inclusion of such coverage
from any plan purchased by anyone receiving federal subsidy. Id.
39. Robert Pear & Jackie Calmes, Senators Battle over Two Public Insurance Proposals and Reject Both, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2009, at A 18 (describing the rejection by the
Senate Committee of two proposals for a single-payer option).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. See generally Health Care in the
U.S., AMNESTY INT'L USA, http://www.amnestyusa.org/demand-dignity/health-care-is-ahuman-right/page.do?id=1021216 (last visited Oct. 29, 2013); Human Right to Health,
NAT'L ECON. & Soc. RTS. INITIATIVE, http://www.nesri.org/programs/health (last visited Oct.
29, 2013). But see Pear & Baker, supra note 30.
41.
See Dorothy Samuels, Where Abortion Rights Are Disappearing,N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 25, 2011, at SR14 (noting "a newly intensified drive by anti-abortion forces").
42. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2006).
43. Stephanie Bornstein, The Law of Gender Stereotyping and the Work-Family
Conflicts of Men, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1297, 1300 n.9 (2012).
44. Id.
45. See id. at 1319, 1324 (describing workplace ridicule and job loss suffered by
caregiving men).
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ously injured in a car accident, he was fired. 46 Hibbs had to take his case to
the Supreme Court before he was reinstated.47
C. The Constitution
The Framers, like most of their contemporaries, left reproductive work
to the private sphere and the women who lived there. The Supreme Court,
nevertheless, has cobbled together a long line of cases affirming that "our
laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education."48 Citing earlier cases in which the Court had held
that parents had a constitutionally protected interest in deciding how their
children were to be educated,49 the Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut"
that reproductive rights were protected under a right to privacy, found in the
penumbra of the Ninth Amendment. 5
The idea of grounding reproductive rights in privacy has been criticized since it was articulated.52 Feminists have pointed out the implications
of "privacy" for women.53 As Linda McClain observes, "privacy connotes
female seclusion and subordination, leading to women's underparticipation
in society and vulnerability to violence in the home."' These concerns are
particularly sharp in the context of reproductive rights. As Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor noted in striking Pennsylvania's spousal notification law in
Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey: "[T]here are
millions of women in this country who are the victims of regular physical
and psychological abuse at the hands of their husbands. Should these wom46. Nev. Dep't Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 725 (2003).
47. Id. at 725, 740.
48. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003).
49. See, e.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (striking down a state statute requiring children to attend public
school noting that "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations"); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923) (holding that
the state cannot prevent parents from having their children learn a foreign language).
50. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (striking down a Connecticut law barring the provision
of contraceptives and medical advice regarding their use).
51. Id. at 484-86.
52. As Justice Stewart observed, dissenting in Griswold, the Connecticut statute "is
an uncommonly silly law," but nothing in the Constitution bars it. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); see also John Hart Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92
HARV. L. REV. 5, 37-38 (1978) (arguing that privacy lacks a coherent conceptual basis).
53. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON
LIFE AND LAW 93-102 (1987) (arguing that the public/private distinction has been detrimental
to women).
54. Linda C. McClain, Reconstructive Tasks for a Liberal Feminist Conception of

Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L.

REV.

759, 762 (1999).
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en become pregnant, they may have very good reasons for not wishing to
inform their husbands of their decision to obtain an abortion."55
"Privacy," moreover, is negative; it requires the state to refrain from
taking action rather than imposing any affirmative obligations. As Frances
Olsen and others have noted, grounding reproductive rights in privacy undercuts claims for public funding.56 Because the United States does not recognize affirmative reproductive rights, American women enjoy only the
reproductive rights they can afford.57
American proponents of reproductive rights have long argued that these rights should be grounded in "equality."58 As Neil Siegel and Reva Siegel
show, Justice Ginsburg relied on "equality" while representing a pregnant
service woman in 1972."9
But gender "equality" is problematic under the Constitution. As Professor Sylvia A. Law notes: "[T]he development of modern constitutional
sex equality doctrine has suffered from a lack of focus on biological reproductive differences between men and women."' In addition, sex-based clas55. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 893
(1992).
56. Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARV. L. REV. 105, 116 (1989).
57. See, e.g., supra note 38 (describing the effects of the Stupak-Pitts Amendment).
58. "[A]bortion restrictions are deeply tied to stereotypical views about the sexes
and about the duties of women ... " Jack M. Balkin, Roe v. Wade: An Engine of Controversy, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 3, 19 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (grounding
reproductive rights in liberty and equality); see, e.g., Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal
Protection Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution,
18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 419, 435-55 (1995). See generally MARTHA CHAMALLAS,
INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 294-95 (1999).
59. Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg on
Pregnancy DiscriminationAs Sex Discrimination,59 DUKE L.J. 771 (2010) (citing Brief for
Petitioner, Struck v. Sec'y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-178), 1972 WL 135840
and citing Ginsburg's brief on behalf of a pregnant service woman in a case that was settled);
see also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Postscriptto Struck by Stereotype, 59 DUKE L.J. 799, 800
(2010) (noting that "[the authors have captured just what was on my mind and in my
heart"). Katharine Bartlett, then a law student, made a similar argument. Katharine Bartlett,
Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution: The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1532,
1564 (1974); see also Barbara Brown et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 893-94 (1971); David S. Law & Mila
Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 762,
806 (2012) (noting that the failure of the United States Constitution to assure women's rights
is one of the features that makes it a global outlier).
60. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955,955
(1984); Reva B. Siegel, Revised Opinions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton: Siegel, J.,
(concurring), in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 58, at 63, 72 (noting
that "physical differences between the sexes, in particular a women's unique capacity to
gestate life, occasion some of the most persistent and deep-rooted assumptions about the
different roles and worth of men and women"); see also Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Synergy of Equality and Privacy in Women's Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL. F. 137, 147-50 (discussing the intersection between privacy and equality in the context of reproductive rights).
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sifications are only viewed as "quasi-suspect" by the Supreme Court.6 Unlike race, they do not trigger strict scrutiny. As Suzanne Goldberg has
shown, this has produced a hopelessly convoluted jurisprudence.6 2
Like privacy doctrine, moreover, "equal protection" imposes no affirmative obligations on the state.63 Because of this, "equality" doesn't go
far enough. As Martha Fineman explains, "[An impoverished sense of
equality is embedded in our current legal doctrine. We understand equality
in terms that are formal, focused on discrimination, and inattentive to underlying societal inequities."' Robin West, similarly, faults the legalistic safeguards of Roe and Casey for neglecting the social and economic circumstances in which reproductive choices are made.6" Ruth Colker puts it plainly: "A woman, in my view, has the right to seek an abortion to protect the
value of her life in a society that disproportionately imposes the burdens of

61. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198, 204 (1976) (striking down an Oklahoma law
setting a higher age limit for males than for females to purchase 3.2% beer because the sexbased classification was not "substantially related" to an "important governmental objective").
62. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REv. 481, 481-85
(2004). Goldberg argues for a single standard for equal protection analysis. Id. at 484. See
generally Symposium, Centennial Panel: Two Decades of IntermediateScrutiny: Evaluating
Equal Protectionfor Women, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1997). Law argues that the burden
should be on the state in cases of sex discrimination: "Given how central state regulation of
biology has been to the subjugation of women, the normal presumption of constitutionality is
inappropriate and the state should bear the burden of justifying its rule." Law, supra note 60,
at 1009. Ratification of CEDAW would not necessarily subject gender-based regulations to
the same standard as race-based regulations, however. As Chinkin and Charlesworth have
pointed out, for example, the obligations imposed on states parties under the Women's Convention require them to take "all appropriate measures" without delay, in contrast to the
"immediately binding" obligations imposed under the Race Convention. HILARY
CHARLESWORTH

& CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE BOUNDARIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: A

220 (2000).
See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring
Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008).
64. Id. at2.
65. See generally Robin West, From Choice to Reproductive Justice: DeconstitutionalizingAbortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394 (2009). West argues elsewhere that
"[m]othering children, as we presently socially construct that work, is incompatible with the
basic rights and responsibilities of citizenship." Robin West, Revised Opinions in Roe v.
Wade and Doe v. Bolton: West, J., (concurring in the judgment), in WHAT ROE V. WADE
FEMINIST ANALYSIS

63.

SHOULD HAVE SAID,

supra note 58, at 121, 141. Assuring reproductive rights, for West, is

"pathetically inadequate." Id. at 141. But see Reva B. Siegel, Introduction: The Constitutional Law and Politics of Reproductive Rights, 1I8 YALE L.J. 1312, 1314-15 (criticizing West's
Yale symposium article for slighting the accomplishments of reproductive rights right advocates).

The Women's Convention

pregnancy and child care on women and does not sufficiently sponsor the
development and use of safe, effective contraceptives. '
The same criticism applies to state treatment of reproductive work.
Like reproductive rights, reproductive work-bearing, caring for, raising,
and educating children-has been recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as
protected from state interference under the Constitution. States cannot prohibit parents from having their children taught a foreign language in school,
for example.67 Nor can states require parents to send their children to public
school.68 The scope of this protection is fiercely contested, however, especially with respect to pregnancy, the avoidance of pregnancy,69 the termination of pregnancy,7" and discrimination against pregnant workers.7
Whatever the scope of this protection, however, none of it is entitled
to material state support under American law. None of it is constitutionally
mandated. With the exception of public education, and a few struggling
federal programs, the United States does not support reproductive work.
66. Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: Toward Love, Compassion,
and Wisdom, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 1011, 1050 (1989) (footnote omitted). See generally RUTH
COLKER, ABORTION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW (1992).
67. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
68. Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S.
510 (1925).
69. In 2011, Kathleen Sebelius, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, invoked her authority under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to ban the purchase of
over-the-counter emergency contraception by women under the age of seventeen. Memorandum from Kathleen Sebelius, Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., to Margaret Hamburg,
Comm'r of Food & Drugs (Dec. 7, 2011). In a federal court opinion in the District Court of
Eastern New York, Judge Edward Korman overturned this action, thereby making the purchase of emergency non-prescription contraception available to all women, with no prescription necessary. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-CV-763 (ERK)(VVP), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
49666, at *101 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).
70. See Samuels, supra note 41 (noting that sixty-one state laws restricting access to
abortion, including mandatory waiting periods and "demeaning 'counseling' sessions lacking
a real medical justification" were enacted during the first eight months of 2011). Only twelve
states have no such onerous restrictions. Id.
71. See, e.g., Joanna L. Grossman, Pregnancy, Work and the Promise of Equal
Citizenship, 98 GEO. L.J. 567, 569-78 (2010); Joanna L. Grossman & Gillian L. Thomas,
Making Pregnancy Work: Overcoming the PregnancyDiscriminationAct's Capacity-Based
Model, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 15 (2009); Dina Bakst, Pregnant,and Pushed Out of a Job,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2012, at A25 (noting that, while "three-quarters of women now entering
the work force will become pregnant on the job," because of a gap between discrimination
and disability laws, employers are not required to "accommodate most pregnant workers in
any way").
72. See Binyamin Appelbaum & Robert Gebeloff, Even Critics of Safety Net Increasingly Depend On It, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2012, at I (noting that the share of federal
benefits to the poorest 20% has declined from 54% in 1979 to 36% in 2007). These programs
include CHIP, Vaccines for Children Program, Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for
Women, Infants and Children, and Head Start. See What Is CHIP?, INSUREKIDsNow.GOV,
http://www.insurekidsnow.gov/chip/index.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2013) (explaining the
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Thus, while the decision whether to bear or beget a child is protected as a
fundamental liberty interest,73 neither pregnant women nor new parents are
entitled to paid leave.7 4 Parental choices regarding education are given considerable deference, but if a state chooses to reduce funding in a nondiscriminatory manner, the Constitution poses no obstacle.75
Indeed, it is well settled that economic rights in general are not protected under the United States Constitution,76 although several eminent
scholars have argued that they should be.77 The rejection of affirmative economic and social rights disproportionately affects American women because
of their reproductive work. Because the United States provides far less material support for reproductive work than any other industrialized democracy, the burden falls on American women. Like its support for healthcare,78
the little support the state does provide takes the form of ephemeral policy
preferences;79 it is not anchored in rights.
Equal protection, like American constitutional jurisprudence in general, is grounded in negative rights, freedom from government intrusion or
control. As set out in the preceding section, American feminists have alprogram that provides free or low-cost health insurance for eligible children up to age nineteen); Vaccines for Children Program (VFC), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/programs/vfc/default.htm (last updated Apr. 24,
2013); U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., WIC-THE SPECIAL SUPPLEMENTAL NUTRITION PROGRAM FOR
WOMEN, INFANTS AND CHILDREN

(2012), available at http://www.fns.usda.gov/wicWIC-

Fact-Sheet.pdf; U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., About Head Start, HEAD START,
http://eclkc.ohs.acf.hhs.gov/hslc/hs/about (last updated Oct. 1, 2013) (promoting "the school
readiness of children ages birth to five from low-income families by enhancing their cognitive, social, and emotional development").
73. See supra note 48.
74. Even the two states that do provide paid leave do not ground the leave in their
constitutions. See supra notes 32-34.
75. See infra note 77.
76. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289 (1984)
(no right to sleep in public places); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 300-02 (1980) (no fight
to Medicaid funding for abortion); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972) (no right to
housing); see also Law & Versteeg, supra note 59, at 806 (noting that the failure of the Constitution to assure economic rights is one of the major features making it a global outlier).
77. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the
FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); Charles L. Black, Jr., Further Reflections on the ConstitutionalJustice of Livelihood, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) (discussing the "derivation of a constitutional right to a decent material basis for life"); Paul
Brest, FurtherBeyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J.
1623, 1628 (1988) ("'[M]inimum protections' for the necessities of life... are preconditions
for civic republican citizenship." (quoting Michelman, supra, at 14)); see also Goodwin Liu,
Rethinking Constitutional Welfare Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 203 (2008). Some economic
rights are assured under state constitutions. See Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the United
States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strategy," 44
HASTINGS L.J. 79 (1992).
78. See supranotes 30, 38-40 (describing state support for healthcare).
79. See supranote 72 (describing current healthcare programs).
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ready noted the limits of this approach. Equality for women requires affirmative measures.
III. CEDAW
CEDAW was drafted by an international group of experts on women's
rights from a broad range of educational and experiential backgrounds.8"
Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VII, women were not an afterthought, or a bad joke." CEDAW, drafted by women for women, takes
women seriously.82
Equality under CEDAW is broader in scope than American equal protection doctrine. It bars all forms of discrimination; there is no requirement
of intent, state action, or disparate impact.83 Second, CEDAW goes beyond
American constitutional law to assure positive as well as negative rights,
imposing affirmative obligations on the state. Third, CEDAW explicitly
addresses reproduction and reproductive work. Fourth, CEDAW recognizes
that gender stereotypes are detrimental to men as well as to women, and
more specifically, requires the state to promote men's caregiving responsibilities. Fifth, Article 16 expressly provides for equality between women
and men in all aspects of marriage. 8 CEDAW promises the kind of equality,
in short, that supports, promotes, and requires comprehensive marriage
equality.
A. Women's Human Rights
CEDAW requires states to assure women's human rights, including
their rights to participate in social, economic, cultural, and political life on
equal terms with men. These rights include the civil and political rights familiar to Americans from our own Constitution, such as the right to vote.8
These rights also include less familiar economic and social rights, such as
the right to work86 and the right to health.87 Thus, CEDAW imposes affirma80.
See LARS ADAM REHOF, GUIDE TO THE TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST

6, 9 (1993).
81. Jo Freeman, How "Sex" Got into Title VII: Persistent Opportunism As a Maker
of Public Policy, 9 LAw & INEQ., 163, 163-65 (1991) (debunking the myth that "sex" was
added as a joke).
82. See generally Barbara Stark, Women's Rights, in5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 341 (David P. Forsythe ed., 2009) (offering a general introduction to CEDAW and
the series of global conferences focusing on women and related UN initiatives).
83. See Judith Resnik, What's Federalism For?, inTHE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at
269, 274-75 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
84. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 20.
85. Id.at 17.
86. Id.at 18.
WOMEN
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tive obligations on the state. In addition, rights are to be assured in fact as
well as in law. That is, CEDAW goes beyond formal equality (equality of
opportunity) to require result equality.88
CEDAW's bar against "discrimination" is stronger than that set out in
the Fourteenth Amendment:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women" shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.89

Under Article 2, furthermore, "States Parties condemn discrimination
against women in all its forms" and "agree to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against
women."' Article 4 specifically provides for affirmative action "aimed at
accelerating defacto equality."'"
"

1. Article 5
CEDAW's most ambitious, and most radical, mandate is set out in Article 5, which explicitly addresses gender stereotypes and men's responsibility for reproductive work.92 As noted in a leading human rights text, "[tihe
breadth and aspiration of [Article 5] can be described only as striking." 3
Article 5 is "striking" in at least two ways. First, it recognizes that gender
87.
88.

Id. at 19.
Charlesworth & Chinkin, supra note 62, at 217. See generally MARTHA

ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE

REFORM (1991).

89. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 16.
90. Id.
91. Id. There is an enormous amount of literature on CEDAW. Some sources especially pertinent here include: Rebecca J. Cook, State Accountability Under the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 228 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994);
Andrew Byrnes, Human Rights Instruments Relating Specifically to Women, with Particular
Emphasis on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women, in ADVANCING THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: USING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS STANDARDS IN DOMEsnc LITIGATION 39 (Andrew Byrnes, Jane Connors & Lum Bik
eds., 1997); REHOF, supra note 80; and Alda Facio & Martha I. Morgan, Equity or Equality
for Women? UnderstandingCEDA W's Equality Principles,60 ALA. L. REV. 1133 (2009).
92. For an in-depth analysis of Article 5, see Rikki Holtmaat, Article 5, in THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN: A
COMMENTARY 141 (Marsha A. Freeman, Christine Chinkin & Beate Rudolf eds., 2012)
[hereinafter CEDAW COMMENTARY].
93. HENRY J. STEINER, PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 184 (3d ed. 2007).
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stereotypes limit men as well as women and that any meaningful notion of
"equality" must address the limits on both.' Second, it recognizes and requires the state to support "maternity as a social function."95
Under Article 5, reproduction is both supported by the state and disaggregated from women's traditional roles. First, Article 5(a) requires states
to:
take all appropriate measures .. .[t]o modify the social and cultural patterns of
conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices
and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
or the
superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and wom96
en.

CEDAW recognizes that "stereotyped roles" are socially constructed
and that they are neither immutable nor "natural." In its responses to the
reports filed by states parties, the Committee has clarified the scope of this
provision, drawing on concrete examples from the reports themselves. In
Slovakia, for example, the Committee has expressed concern about "the
persistence of traditional stereotypes regarding the roles and tasks of women
and men in the family and in society at large." 97 Nigeria, similarly, reported
on six ambitions programs undertaken to eliminate stereotypes pursuant to
Article 5, including a new "National Policy on Education ... aimed at encouraging increased participation of the girl child in science and technology" and data indicating "that women are beginning to undertake those voca-

94. Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in ConstitutionalSex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 86-87 (2010) (noting that "when it became clear that the
[Women's Rights Project] was serious about establishing the right of men to be free from sex
discrimination, the laughter turned to confusion and disbelief, and, in some cases, to anger
and disgust").
95. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17. Article 10 of the Economic Covenant requires
states to afford some protections to mothers, but CEDAW is the first human rights instrument to comprehensively address reproduction. International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights, supra note 29, at 7.
96. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17. This is a far-ranging prohibition, and a full discussion of its implications is beyond the scope of this Article. See Franklin, supra note 94, at
163-72 (describing implications of a bar on sex-role stereotyping on LGBT rights); Barbara
Stark, The Women's Convention, Reproductive Rights, and the Reproduction of Gender, 18
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POCY 261, 274-78 (2011) (explaining why CEDAW requires the
recognition of same-sex relationships).
97. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Slovakia, 41st Sess., June 30-July 18, 2008, U.N. Doc. A163/38 (July 17, 2008) (recommending "that policies be developed and programmes implemented to ensure the eradication
of traditional sex role stereotypes in the family, labour market, the health sector, academia,
politics and society at large").
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tions which were previously considered masculine such as motor mechanic,
welding, commercial drivers and motor-cyclists." 98
The gendered division of labor may seem "universal" such as the
widespread acceptance of female nurses.99 Other examples are idiosyncratic,
such as the outraged response to female cashiers in Saudi Arabia."° Article
5 bars all such stereotypes, even as it recognizes women's unique reproductive capacity and men's responsibility for reproductive work. Under
CEDAW, women, like men, have rights, and men, like women, are expected
to assume caregiving responsibilities."°'
Second, Article 5(b) demands recognition of maternity as a "social
function" and requires states to educate men to share in reproductive work
"[t]o ensure that family education includes a proper understanding of maternity as a social function and the recognition of the common responsibility
of men and women in the upbringing and development of their children."'"2
The Committee has repeatedly stressed that "concrete measures are
needed to promote the role of men in unpaid care activities."'' 3 The Committee has also questioned parental leave policies, which "'continue to place

98. United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women,
Consideration of Reps. Submitted by State Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: Nigeria, 53, 41st Sess., June
30-July 18, 2008, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/NGA/CO/6 (Oct. 5, 2008).
99. See, e.g., WORLD BANK, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. & INT'L FUND FOR AGRIC. DEV.,
GENDER
IN
AGRICULTURE
SOURCEBOOK
315
(2007),
available
at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGENAGRLIVSOUBOOK/Resources/CompleteBook.
pdf; Some Occupations Becoming More Gender-Neutral, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK Q., Winter 2004-2005, at 48, 48 (noting that men in United States increased their share of employment in nursing between 1983 and 2002, although the field remains dominated by women).
100. See, e.g., Fatima Sidiya, Debate Rages over Saudi Women Working As Cashiers,
ARAB NEWS (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.arabnews.com/node/353055. See generally Margarita Estrvez-Abe, Gendering the Varieties of Capitalism:A Study of OccupationalSegregation by Sex in Advanced IndustrialSocieties, 59 WORLD POL. 142, 143 (2006) (noting "genuine puzzles" in cross-national patterns).
101. D. BRENDAN NAGLE, THE HOUSEHOLD AS THE FOUNDATION OF ARISTOTLE'S
POuS (2006) (explaining "rightsholder" and "caregiver" stereotypes in Aristotles's polis).
102. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17 (emphasis added). As Reva B. Siegel notes, this is
crucial:
Perhaps the most prominent feature of the sexual equality approach to reproductive
rights is its attention to the social as well as physical aspects of reproductive relations. A sex equality analysis is characteristically skeptical of the traditions, conventions, and customs that shape the sex and family roles of men and women.
Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and
Evolving ConstitutionalExpression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815,817 (2007).
103. See Holtmaat, supra note 92, at 164 (citing comments on the reports of Iceland
and the Ukraine).
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primary responsibility for family work and childcare on women, rather than
emphasizing the shared responsibility of men and women.""'
2. Reproductive Rights and Reproductive Work
Because reproductive rights focus on experiences-conception, pregnancy, childbirth-that affect women more directly than they affect men,
these experiences are not reflected in traditional rights discourse.' 5
CEDAW corrects this omission by recognizing women's reproductive work
and requiring the state-and men-to support it."° Whether by a state or a
non-state third party, whether by an affirmative act (such as coerced sterili07
zation) or by an omission (such as the refusal to fund family planning),
whether imposed on all women or a discrete group, whether the objective is
to disempower women or to promote women's equality,' 8 CEDAW protects
women's reproductive rights."°
Building on Article 5, later articles more specifically protect women's
reproductive rights and situate reproduction in a social and cultural context.
Article 11(2), for example, sets out the measures to be taken by states to
"prevent discrimination ...on the grounds of marriage or maternity and to
ensure [women's] effective right to work.""0 These measures include the
prohibition of dismissal for pregnancy or maternity leave,"' maternity leave
"with pay" or "comparable social benefits,"'" 2 and the "necessary supporting
social services to enable parents to combine family obligations with work
responsibilities and participation in public life, in particular through promoting the establishment ... of child-care facilities."'' Article 12 requires the
state to "ensure . . . access to health care services, including those related to
104. Id. (quoting Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, 21st Sess., June 7-25 1999, 183, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess.,
Supp. No. 38 (1999)).
105. See CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., David D. Kirkpatrick & Robert Pear, A Victory in Health Care Vote for
Opponents of Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2009, at AI (describing the restriction on abortion coverage added to the health care bill passed by the House).
108. See Barbara Stark, Reproductive Rights and the Reproduction of Gender, in
GENDER EQUALITY: DIMENSIONS OF WOMEN'S EQUAL CITIZENSHIP 350-53 (Linda C. McClain

& Joanna L. Grossman eds., 2009) (describing the objectives of the one-child policy in China, including women's equality).
109. For a detailed account of the ways in which the Committee, through its general
comments as well as its observations with respect to specific country reports, highlights the
states' obligations, see Rebecca J. Cook & Ver6nica Undurraga, Article 12, in CEDAW
COMMENTARY, supra note 92, at 311, 320-23.
110. CEDAW, supranote 4, at 18.
111. Id.at 19.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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family planning" and, more specifically, to "ensure to women appropriate
services in connexion with pregnancy, confinement and the post-natal period, granting free services where necessary, as well as adequate nutrition
during pregnancy and lactation."'" 4 Article 14 sets out the right to family
planning services for rural women in particular."5 Article 16 requires states
to "take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women
in all matters relating to marriage and family relations."" 6
CEDAW does not explicitly assure a right to abortion, reflecting the
lack of consensus among states." 7 But the CEDAW Committee has criticized states for prohibiting abortion"' and "continually asks States to re114. Id. The Committee's General Recommendation No. 24 elaborates on Article
12.1, addressing women's access to health care, including family planning services. The
Committee recommends that "[w]hen possible, legislation criminalizing abortion should be
amended, in order to withdraw punitive measures imposed on women who undergo abortion." Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 20th Sess.,
Jan. 19-Feb. 5, 1999, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.1; GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999). For
a more detailed formulation of these rights, see Protocol to the African Charter on Human
and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa art. 14, Doc. CAB/LEG/66.6 (Sept.
13, 2000), available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/protocol-women2003.html.
See generally CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS, THE PROTOCOL ON THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN IN
AFRICA: AN INSTRUMENT FOR ADVANCING REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL RIGHTS (2006), available at http://www.reproductiverights.org/pdf/pub-bp-africa.pdf.
115. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 18.
116. Id. at 20. Article 16 has received an unprecedented number of reservations.
Rebecca J.Cook, Reservations to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 30 VA. J.INT'L L. 643, 702 (1990). "Two States Parties to the
Convention-Malta and Monaco--explicitly stated in their reservations to CEDAW that they
do not interpret Article 16(1)(e) as imposing or forcing the legalization of abortion in their
respective countries." LUISA BLANCHFIELD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40750, THE U.N.
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN
(CEDAW): ISSUES IN THE U.S. RATIFICATION DEBATE 14 (2010).

117. See, e.g., Berta E. Hemdndez, To Bear or Not to Bear: Reproductive Freedom
As an International Human Right, 17 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 309, 341 (1991); Conseil
constitutionnell [CC] [Constitutional Court] Jan. 15, 1975, JCP 49 1118030 (Fr.) (upholding
France's abortion law); Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego [Constitutional Court] r. Sygn. akt K.
26/96, May 28, 1997, ORZECZNICTWO TRYBUNALU KONSTYTUCYJNEGO 173 (Pol.) (detailing
the decision of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal striking down legislation enacted to liberalize abortion, citing, inter alia, Poland's Constitution); Law No. 239 (1970), as amended by
Law No. 564 (1978)
and Law
No. 572 (1985)
(Fin.), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/population/abortion/Finland.abo.htm (describing the interruption of pregnancy). See generally Florian Miedel, Is West Germany's 1975 Abortion Decision a Solution to the American Abortion Debate?: A Critique of Mary Ann Glendoon and
Donald Kommers, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 471, 475 (1994); David Bradley, Convergence in Family Law: Mirrors, Transplants and Political Economy, 6 MAASTRICHT J.
EUR. &COMP. L. 127, 134 (1999).
118. See, e.g., BLANCHFIELD, supra note 116, at 15 (noting that the Committee recommended to Mexico that "'all states ... review their legislation so that, where necessary,
women are granted access to rapid and easy abortion,"' and "urg[ing] Poland 'to ensure that
women seeking legal abortion have access to it, and that their access is not limited by the use
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move penalties for women undergoing abortion."'" 9 The Committee has also
pointed out that "[i]t is discriminatory for a State party to refuse to provide
legally for the performance of certain reproductive health services for women.' 20 At the same time, CEDAW has been ratified without reservations by
several states limiting abortion. 2 ' As Professors Cook and Undurraga note,
"
however, "States parties have entered no reservations to Article 12. 22
3. Article 16
Article 16 provides in pertinent part:
I.

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations and in
particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) The same right to enter into marriage;
(b) The same right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only
with their free and full consent;
(c) The same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its dissolution;
(d) The same rights and responsibilities as parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their children; in all cases the interests of
the children shall be paramount;
(e) The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education
and means to enable them to exercise these rights;

(f)

The same personal rights as husband and wife, including the right to
choose a family name, a profession and an occupation;

of the conscientious objection clause"' (quoting Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women, 18th Sess., 19th Sess., Jan. 19-Feb. 6, 1998, June 22-July
10, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/54/38/Rev.l; GAOR, 53rd Sess., Supp. No. 38 (1999); United Nations, Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding Comments
of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: Poland, 5, 37th Sess.,
Jan. 15-Feb. 2, 2007, UN Doc. CEDAW/C/POUCO/6 (Feb. 2, 2007)).
119. Cook & Undurraga, supra note 109, at 322.
120. Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, supra
note 114, at 3-4.
121.
"Currently, over 60% of the world's people live in countries where induced
abortion is permitted either for a wide range of reasons or without restriction as to reason. In
contrast, about 26% of all people reside in countries where abortion is generally prohibited."
CTR.
FOR
REPROD.
RTS.,
THE WORLD'S
ABORTION
LAWS: 2007
(2007),
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/Abortion%2Map-FA.
pdf.
122. Cook & Undurraga, supra note 109, at 332.
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(g) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the ownership, acquisition,
management, administration, enjoyment and disposition
of property,
23
whether free of charge or for a valuable consideration.1
24
Article 16 explicitly provides for gender equality within marriage.
25
For this reason, it has triggered more reservations than any other article.
States take reservations to treaty provisions to which they object. Reservations to Article 16 cite conflict with religious or cultural norms, or are simply included in general reservations to the entire Convention, on the ground
26
that state religious or constitutional law must trump.1
The United States has taken such a general reservation-i.e., a reservation to the effect that, if any provision of the treaty conflicts with the
United States Constitution, the United States will not be bound by it-to
other human rights treaties it has ratified.2 7 It intends to do so here. But the
CEDAW Committee has strongly discouraged such reservations, and they
28
would not support marriage equality.
The argument here would be the familiar federalism argument; that is,
that domestic relations law is the province of the states. Whatever force this
argument retained after Missouri v. Holland,'29 it has surely lost in view of
the "federalization" of family law 3 ° and the Supreme Court's recent holding
in United States v. Windsor.'3 ' Even if states sought to challenge CEDAW,
moreover, it is difficult to imagine a winning argument against a state's

123.
124.
125.
409, 441.
126.
127.

CEDAW, supra note 4, at 20.
Id.
Marsha A. Freeman, Article 16, in CEDAW

COMMENTARY,

supra note 92, at

Id.
See Jack Goldsmith, The Unexceptional U.S. Human Rights RUDs, 3 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 311, 311-13 (2005).
128. While some pornography permitted by the United States Constitution may well
be condemned under CEDAW, this is beyond the scope of this Article, since pertinent articles focus on trafficking and those who oppose CEDAW in the United States are not arguing
that it would have a chilling effect on trafficking or Internet porn. See generally Janie
Chuang, Article 6, in CEDAW COMMENTARY, supra note 92, at 169, 177 (noting that it was
proposed, but rejected, "that Article 6 should refer to 'combating also those forms of commercial advertisement and exploitation which use the female body in a way contrary to human dignity' (quoting U.N. Secretary-General, Draft Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of DiscriminationAgainst Women, 79, UN Doc. E/CN.6/591 (June 21, 1976)).
129. 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920). Federalism undoubtedly retained some force, at least
in the context of state criminal law. See, e.g., Medellifn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522-23
(2008), stay of execution denied, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008).
130. E.g., Linda D. Elrod, The Federalization of Family Law, A.B.A. HUM. RTS.,
Summer 2009, at 6-9; Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 419-24 (2007); David D. Meyer, The
Constitutionalizationof Family Law, 42 FAM. L.Q. 529, 538-39 (2008).
131.
133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695-96 (2013) (striking down the Defense of Marriage Act).
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right to discriminate against a woman in this context, especially in view of
CEDAW's affirmative recognition of maternity.
As Professor Marsha A. Freeman astutely observes:
[Article 16] breaks the presumptive privacy barrier that has historically prevented
examination of the family equality and power dynamic in the name of "protecting
the family." Article 16 provides a map for examining that dynamic, indicating that
rights
protection of the family requires protection of spouses' individual human
132
and promotion of equality between them, rather than maintaining family.

In other words, if gender inequality saturates the culture, it will almost
certainly pervade the family, which is by definition private, outside the view
of the public. For the Convention to require states to promote equality within the family, accordingly, means that individuals, women and men, are
encouraged-and expected-to internalize these norms. The specific provisions of Article 16 set out in detail how this is to be accomplished.
The paradox of Article 16, of course, is that most of it is obviously unenforceable. If women and men in fact receive the "family education" set
out in Article 5(b), 33 presumably they will at least notice inequality within
the family. But the invisibility of deeply entrenched norms has been well
documented. As Professor Freeman explains:
Most inequalities within families do not reach the public, formal level of evaluation and decision-making, as those mechanisms usually are invoked only when a
family experiences a death or a breakup. The quotidian dynamic of sharing responsibilities within intact families occurs behind the real or virtual walls that surround
families in every social and cultural context. The operation of "same rights and responsibilities" is worked out in negotiations based on unwritten
34 rules that may or
may not be subject to discussion. The negotiations are private. 1

Precisely because Article 16 is unenforceable, its realization depends
on vigilance in promoting gender equality throughout the culture. Equality
within marriage, in short, is only attainable if equality becomes the norm, so
that not only both parties are aware of the discrimination faced by fathers
who take parental leave, but also that such discrimination is rejected across
the board. As Professor Freeman put it:
As a practical matter, laws providing for equality in sharing household tasks and
care of children are not amenable to enforcement. States cannot monitor whether
daily decision-making is based on imbalance of power between the parties and traditional gender roles. They can and must, however, provide for full legal capacity
and economic equality and work towards elimination of customs and stereotypes
men in making these dethat prevent women from engaging on an equal basis with 35
cisions. Changing this dynamic transforms the institution.'

132.
133.
134.
135.

Freeman, supra note 125, at 411.
CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17; see supra text accompanying note 102.
Freeman, supra note 125, at 416.
Id. at 439 (footnote omitted).
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Referring to the widely accepted "respect-protect-fulfill" framework
for states in meeting their human rights obligations, Professor Freeman
notes that in order to "fulfill" its obligations under Article 16, "States must
also provide for education on family life issues from an early age, and for
other efforts to change attitudes, with a view towards addressing gender
stereotypes and power imbalances between male and female that... perpet' 13 6
uate inequality in the family."
B. In the United States
Ratification of CEDAW would transform the legal landscape in the
United States, for men as well as for women, if it is ratified in good faith.
This is a big "if." All of the major human rights treaties ratified by the United States have been accompanied by a package of reservations, understandings, and declarations ("RUDs") intended to limit their impact.'37 This both
results from the United States' long and troubled history with respect to
international human rights, and perpetuates that history.'38
The Obama Administration has promised to do better. It has directed
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to move forward on CEDAW.'39 In
2013, Secretary of State John Kerry reaffirmed his support for CEDAW and
the Administration's support for ratification."n Taking the Administration at
its word, the rest of this Section assumes that the United States ratifies
CEDAW in good faith and analyzes CEDAW's impact on United States
law.
136. Id. at440-41.
137. See, e.g., S. EXEC. Doc. No. 102-23 (1992) ("[T]he [Civil] Covenant will not
create a private cause of action in U.S. courts.").
138. In 1953, Senator Bricker of Ohio proposed an amendment to the United States
Constitution which would require an Act of Congress before any human rights treaty could
become law in the United States. Louis B. SOHN & THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 964-65 (1973). The Eisenhower Administration was able to
defeat the Bricker Amendment, but only by promising not to ratify any human rights treaties.
Id.; see also Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conventions: The Ghost of
Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J.INT'L L. 341, 349 (1995) (suggesting that, as a practical matter,
Bricker has prevailed).
139. CEDAW Hearing Encouraging, U.S. Ratification Long Overdue, NAT'L ORG.
FOR WOMEN (Nov. 19, 2010), http://www.now.org/press/1l-10/11-19.html?printable (applauding Senator Dick Durbin "for chairing a first-ever Judiciary committee hearing ... on
ratification of [CEDAW]"). Ratification of CEDAW has been on the agenda for a long time.
See, e.g., MALVINA HALBERSTAM

&

ELIZABETH F. DEFEis, WOMEN'S LEGAL RIGHTS:

ERA? (1987).
140. Senate Foreign Relations Comm., Summary of Kerry Nomination Hearing,
UNITED NATIONS ASS'N U.S.A.,
NAT'L CAPITAL AREA (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://www.unanca.org/news-events/news/102-summary-of-kerry-nomination-hearing
(summarizing the confirmation hearing in which John Kerry publically pledged his support
for CEDAW).
INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AN ALTERNATIVE TO
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As explained in the next Section, CEDAW would operate like a federal statute, supporting and clarifying the line of cases beginning with Griswold"' and including Eisenstadt v. Baird,'42 Roe v. Wade,'43 Casey,'" and

Gonzalez v. Carhart.' That is, reproductive rights, including the right to
contraception and abortion, would no longer be grounded exclusively in
Ninth Amendment privacy. Rather, these rights would also be assured by
CEDAW's affirmative guarantees, including "the common responsibility of
men and women" for their children.'" As discussed above, CEDAW recognizes the obligation of the larger community to provide material support for
maternity-before, during, and after birth.'47 As Professor Law explains,
this is crucial to women's equality, which requires nothing less than the
"transformation of the family, child rearing arrangements, the economy, the
wage labor market, and human consciousness."' 48
Under Article 12, all American women would have access to contraception, which would probably limit the need for abortion.'49 This would
include those women who would have been covered under the Affordable
Care Act but whose governors rejected federal Medicaid. 5 ° Age restrictions
on Plan B, the morning-after pill, have recently been struck down in federal
court. "' The recent development of an after-sex pill that can prevent pregnancy if taken within five days of intercourse'5 2 may further reduce the
141.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
142. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
143. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that, under the Ninth Amendment, women have a
right to abortion subject to the state's interest in protecting the developing fetus).
144. 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992) (affirming the "central holding" of Roe, while
allowing the state to promote its "profound interest in potential life, throughout pregnancy"
so long as the measures adopted by the state "do not constitute an undue burden").
145. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
146. CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17.
147. See supra Section III.A.
148. Law, supra note 60, at 956; see David Leonhardt, A Market Punishing to Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 2010, at B1 ("With Australia's recent passage of paid [parental]
leave, the United States has become the only rich country without such a policy.").
149. The Affordable Care Act, similarly, requires coverage for contraception for
covered women. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2712,
124 Stat. 119, 131 (2010). Some data indicate that the majority of American women who
have had abortions said that they were using contraceptives when they became pregnant.
Balkin, supra note 58, at 5.
150. See Garofalo, supra note 31.
151. See Sebelius, supra note 69; see, e.g., Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-CV-763
(ERK)(VVP), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49666 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).
152. Gardiner Harris, Panel Recommends Approval of After-Sex Pill to Prevent Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMEs, June 18, 2010, at A14 (noting that "dispute [as to] whether the [new]
drug works by delaying ovulation.., or by preventing a fertilized egg from implanting itself
in the uterus"); Nicholas D. Kristof, Another Pill That Could Cause a Revolution, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 2010, at Wk8 (describing misoprostol, a single drug that may make abortion
safer and easier around the world); Emily Bazelon, The New Abortion Providers,N.Y. TIMES

Michigan State Law Review

2013:941

number of abortions sought.'53 The use of teleconferencing to enable women
in the first nine weeks of pregnancy to obtain prescriptions for abortion
"' moreover,
pills, 54
is likely to reduce the number of surgical, as opposed to
medical, abortions.'55 American abortion law, however, would also be affected.
CEDAW would establish a federal floor, situating abortion firmly in
the context of women's reproductive health. This has been obscured in this
country by the complicated politics of abortion. Justice Ginsburg viewed
Roe v. Wade as a political mistake, for example, which "prolonged divisiveness and deferred stable settlement of the issue."'56 Justice William Brennan
also thought it would have been wiser to wait and see what the legislatures
might do, rather than set out Roe's trimester framework.' More recently,
Neal Devins has argued that public opinion drives the law in this context, so
public opinion should be addressed before legal reform is attempted.'58
Reva Siegel has carefully documented the ways in which "constitutional
culture channels social movement conflict"'59 and how the right has tailored

MAG., July 18, 2010, at 30, 44 (noting that "almost 90 percent of the abortions in the U.S. are

performed before 12 weeks; in addition, four years ago, the proportion of procedures performed before 9 weeks reached 62 percent"). The morning-after pill, which is not a form of
abortion, has been available for many years. See, e.g., Op-ed, Respect for Women in Uniform,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 2010, at A20 (commending the Pentagon's decision to make morningafter emergency contraception available to women in the military, criticizing the remaining
rules making abortions available only in cases of rape, incest, or when women's lives are
endangered, and requiring women to pay for such abortions).
153. Harris, supra note 152, at A20 ("[M]ore than one million women who do not
want to get pregnant are estimated to have unprotected sex every night in the United States,
and more than 25,000 become pregnant every year after being sexually assaulted. Half of all
pregnancies in the United States are unintended." (citing James Trussell, director of the Office of Population Research)).
154. Monica Davey, Abortion Drugs Given in Iowa Via Video Link, N.Y. TIMES, June
9, 2010, at AI (noting that 1,500 abortions have been performed in Iowa using teleconferencing equipment at sixteen Iowa clinics since June 2008).
155. Bazelon, supra note 152, at 46 ("Abortion remains the most common surgical
procedure for American women; one-third of them will have one by the age of 45. The number performed annually in the U.S. has largely held steady: 1.3 million in 1977 and 1.2 million three decades later.").
156. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking In a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1208 (1992); see Balkin, supra note 58, at 11.
157. Balkin, supra note 58, at 10.
158. See generally Neal Devins, How Planned Parenthood v. Casey (Pretty Much)
Settled the Abortion Wars, 118 YALE L.J. 1318 (2009).
159. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1323 (2006) (explaining how the "equal protection doctrine prohibiting sex discrimination was forged in the
Equal Rights Amendment's defeat").
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its arguments to reflect cultural change."6 But as Jeffrey Toobin notes, the
efforts of pro-choice centrists to be respectful of their opponents comes at a
high cost to women's health. 6'
The Roberts Court is apparently willing to leave reproductive rights to
the states.'62 As Dawn Johnsen notes, "Since Casey, states have adopted

literally hundreds of abortion restrictions, reflecting an incremental,
multitiered strategy to create 'abortion-free' states and to deter women from
having abortions, often through deception."' 63 As a practical matter, abortion is no longer a real option for some women following the passage of
recent laws imposing time and place restrictions."6 These restrictions, even
if upheld under the Constitution, could arguably be challenged under
CEDAW's explicit protections.'65 Under the Supremacy Clause, moreover,
CEDAW would trump inconsistent state law regarding reproductive
rights.

166

Equally important, CEDAW mandates state support for reproductive
work. This includes quality, free or affordable pre-K care, like the French
160. See generally Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: ConstitutionalConflict and
the Spread of Woman-ProtectiveAntiabortionArgument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008) (explaining how the right has tailored its arguments).
Jeffrey Toobin, Not Covered, NEW YORKER, Nov. 23, 2009, at 37, 38.
161.
162. Charles M. Blow, Op-Ed., Abortion's New Battle Lines, N.Y. TIMES, May 1,
2010, at A19 (describing the "rash of states [that have] rushed to restrict access to abortion..
. It is a striking series of laws, enacted mostly by men, that seek legal control over women's
bodies. I happen to agree with Representative Janet Long of Florida, who said on Friday that
you should 'stand down if you don't have ovaries."').
163. Dawn E. Johnsen, A ProgressiveReproductive Rights Agenda for 2020, in THiE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 83, at 255, 261; see Erik Eckholm, New Laws in 6 States
Ban Abortions After 20 Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at AI0 (citing "fetal pain," despite the lack of scientific support); see also Samuels, supra note 41.
164. See GUTIrMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: AN OVERVIEW OF ABORTION
LAWS (2013), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-OAL.pdf.
165. See CEDAW, supra note 4, at 17-20. But see Johnsen, supra note 163, at 258
(noting that while "litigation has served as the primary and most effective weapon against
dangerous abortion restrictions," a "Court-centered strategy for the coming decades would be
dangerously inadequate").
166. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (striking
down Massachusetts's law on Burma as incompatible with federal law). As noted earlier, this
assumes the ratification of the treaty in good faith. See CEDAW, supra note 4, at 19. Since
the Medellin fiasco in 2008, in which Texas refused to accede to then-President George W.
Bush's request to stay an execution, leaving the United States in violation of international
law, "good faith" requires either language in the transmittal letter indicating that the treaty is
"self-executing" or federal legislation having the same effect. See Medellin v. United States,
129 S. Ct. 360 (2008); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, TreatiesAs Law of the Land: The Supremacy
Clause and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 601-02 (2008)
(explaining why the presumption that treaties are self-executing endures after Medellin). For
an explanation of ratification as a congressional-executive agreement or federal legislation
having the same effect, see Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present,and Future
of InternationalLawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008).
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creche system, as well as quality, affordable child and eldercare.167 As noted
earlier, the United States provides less support for reproductive work than
any other industrialized state.168 By requiring state support for such work,
and explicitly recognizing men's responsibilities for such work, CEDAW
would help bring the United States up to par. At the same time, it would
make equality within marriage a real possibility.
CONCLUSION

This Article has explained why gender equality within marriage is a
fantasy as long as there is no gender equality outside of marriage, in the
broader society. Think of a country, like the United States (in which gender
inequality is the norm), as a country below sea level. Hoping that you can
put your marriage up on stilts is a futile exercise, especially because within
marriage, the quintessential private relationship, the perpetuation of inequality is invisible to the outside world.
Part I has explained the gendered division of labor, how it is replicated, and the ongoing costs to American women, despite changes in the labor
market. Part II has explained why American law has not affectively addressed this problem and why it cannot be expected to. Part 11I has explained how CEDAW addresses the lacunae in American law. By making
gender equality an actual reality in American life, CEDAW would make
marital equality a real possibility for American women and men.

167.
168.

See supra Subsection III.A.1.
See CEDAW, supra note 4, at 16-17.

